Tractatus 2.0121

2.0121 It would, so the speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing that could exist alone on its own account, subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit.
if things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility must already lie in them.
(A logical entity cannot be merely possible. Logic treats of every possibility, and all possibilities are its facts.)
Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal objects apart from time, so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its connexion with other things.
If I can think of an object in the context of an atomic fact, I cannot think of it apart from the possibility of this context.

A meaty remark. I don’t have much to say here. We start to get hints about objects (words?) and their place in atomic facts (propositions?). Why is Wittgenstein worried about accidental logic here? what’s at stake? He quiets an interlocutor that hasn’t raised an objection. To say that logic is accidental would be strange indeed. Though to say it is not accidental is strange as well. What does it mean to say a logical entity cannot be merely possible? I don’t know what a logical entity is, and Wittgenstein doesn’t help us here. If a logical entity cannot be merely possible, then what can it be? Existing as a possibility? I’m not sure.

Also, Witt. gives a little nod to Kant that I missed the first time through the Tractatus. I was told by a teacher here that Witt. wrote on Kant. I had never heard of this before, but would love to see what Witt had to say.

~ by Barky on February 25, 2012.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: